This report sets out to analyze the EU's engagement with local civil society organizations (CSOs) in their efforts to transform the conflict and also to assess their impact and effectiveness in doing so. In the first section, the report provides a brief outline of the conflict. Next, the report considers the domestic environment in which CSOs operate in Moldova/Transnistria, which provides a first insight into the potential for effectiveness and impact in transforming the conflict. The third section looks at the EU's policies towards Moldova/Transnistria and in particular at its involvement in the resolution of the conflict. In the fourth section the EU's engagement with civil society in Moldova is analyzed (in particular the EU's ability to change the structure in which CSOs operate). In the fifth section 16 CSOs (8 from Moldova and 8 from Transnistria) are studied in terms of their activities, impact and effectiveness relating to conflict transformation. The sixth section tests the three hypotheses (the liberal peace paradigm, the leftist critique and the realist critique). The conclusion provides a synthesis of the three hypotheses and is followed by a series of policy recommendations. The paper argues that support for civil society activities appears to offer more possibilities to change the conflict's status quo than mediation efforts, especially considering the growing consolidation of civil society in Moldova.
Introduction
This report sets out to analyze the EU's engagement with local civil society organizations (CSOs) in their efforts to transform the conflict and also to assess their impact and effectiveness in doing so. In the first section, the report provides a brief outline of the conflict. Next, the report considers the domestic environment in which CSOs operate in Moldova/Transnistria, which provides a first insight into the potential for effectiveness and impact in transforming the conflict. The third section looks at the EU's policies towards Moldova/Transnistria and in particular at its involvement in the resolution of the conflict. In the fourth section the EU's engagement with civil society in Moldova is analyzed (in particular the EU's ability to change the structure in which CSOs operate). In the fifth section 16 CSOs (8 from Moldova and 8 from Transnistria) are studied in terms of their activities, impact and effectiveness relating to conflict transformation. The sixth section tests the three hypotheses (the liberal peace paradigm, the leftist critique and the realist critique). The conclusion provides a synthesis of the three hypotheses and is followed by a series of recommendations for Moldova/Transnistria, for the EU's policy towards Moldova/Transnistria and its engagement with CSOs and for Moldovan/Transnistrian CSOs.
The Transnistrian conflict (a brief overview)
The Transnistrian conflict in Moldova is one of several separatist conflicts which still persist throughout the former Soviet Union (SU). It was the shortest and least violent conflict in the SU and the expert community and policy makers believe that the Transnistrian conflict is the easiest separatist conflict to solve throughout the former SU. Yet, the conflict has remained 'frozen' or more precisely, unsolved for the last sixteen years and the IGOs have been very slow to become involved in the management of the conflict.
The conflict is not an ethnic one as it did not pit one ethnic group against another and no ethnic cleansing was perpetrated on Moldova's territory, but rather a geopolitical one, linked to the break-up of a large political structure (the Soviet Union). Nevertheless, the outbreak of the conflict was in part due to the revival of Moldova's Romanian linguistic and cultural heritage. This form of nationalism was seen as threatening the identity (but also political and economic prerogatives) of Moldova's large minority groups (Russian, Ukrainian, Gagaouz, Bulgarian, etc.) .
Further, the conflict was an intra-state conflict or civil war in which the opposing factions had different visions on Moldova's future. The separatists believed in the legitimacy of their claim to independence based on a separate Transnistrian regional identity with strong ties to the SU. Hence, when Moldova declared official independence on 27 August 1991, the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet voted in favour of joining the SU on 2 September 1991. However, despite being an intra-state conflict, it had a strong external dimension as Moscow seized the opportunity to use the nascent conflict to intervene militarily in order to prevent losing its foothold and influence in Moldova.
Moldova declared the state of emergency on 29 March 1992 after Transnistrian paramilitaries had gradually taken control in preceding months of the left bank and serious fighting erupted on 2 April.
The armed conflict culminated in May and June 1992 and died down after the battle of Bender (Tighina) on 19-21 June, where the 14th former Soviet Army stationed in Moldova intervened and drove the Moldovan army out of Bender, thereby putting an end to the conflict. There were over 1000 casualties, 51,000 internally displaced people and 80,000 refugees (fleeing to neighbouring Ukraine) 2 .
During the armed phase of the conflict, the 14th Army fought alongside the Transnistrian forces against the Moldovan army. The intra-state conflict thereby became internationalised through Russia's direct participation on the side of the separatists.
Finally, the Transnistrian separatists have used the lack of progress in the conflict settlement negotiations to strengthen the status quo (de facto independence) and provide the region with many visible state-like attributes and a separate 'national' identity. In addition, the non-recognised status of Transnistria increased its international isolation and the region became rife with illegal economic activities, often with the tacit involvement of businessmen and politicians from Russia, Ukraine, but also Moldova.
Russia's support during and after the conflict has consolidated the position of the separatists and therefore, Moldova considers that only Russia can unlock the situation and bring the separatist to the negotiating table. Russia declares its opposition to Transnistria's independence (as opposed to recognizing the Georgian separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the brief RussianGeorgian war in August 2008). Russia considers that a 'one-state' negotiated settlement is preferable, in return for a number of important concessions on Moldova's part, in particular on a permanent neutrality status.
The fact that Moldova prefers to negotiate with Russia, also results from the failure of the international community to offer any alternative solutions to the conflict. The main peace-broker, the OSCE, has in over sixteen years been unable to alter the status quo of the conflict. There is a consensus that the OSCE should continue to provide the overarching mediation framework (due to its all-inclusive structure), but there are increasing calls for the greater involvement of the EU in these talks, in particular since the ENP is being implemented in Moldova.
The domestic environment in which the CSOs operate
It is essential to glance over the domestic environment in which the CSOs operate in order to better appreciate their level of effectiveness and impact on conflict transformation (which will be discussed in a subsequent section). Firstly though, it should be stressed that conditions in which CSOs operate vary greatly on either bank of the river Nistru. 
Moldova
In Moldova proper the government has, spurred on by the EU through the implementation of the EU- It is fairly easy to set up an NGO in Moldova which also explains the mushrooming of such organizations in search of grants.
European Union or foundations such as the Open Society Foundation). These CSOs risk being viewed as partial instead of independent which could affect their credibility and legitimacy when they become involved in conflict transformation.
In Moldova there are around 7000 NGOs of which nearly half are operational the rest merely existing on paper. 10 The main criticism leveled at Moldovan NGOs is their lack of professionalism and their lack of representativeness and support in Moldovan society at large. In terms of geographical spread, 9
out of 10 NGOs are based in the capital, Chisinau.
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The lack of legitimacy is an important aspect of the overall status of CSOs in Moldovan society.
Opinion poll data shows that 51.9 % of Moldovans do not trust CSOs 12 , which are often viewed as a personal platform for individuals, as structures used for money laundering, or as political tools and mouthpieces for the government, political parties or foreign interests. This is particularly so for midlevel CSO and less the case for grassroots NGOs, the latter having a more social orientation (poverty, human rights, women's rights, gender equality, assistance to persons with disabilities, etc.). This lack of public trust in CSOs stems particularly from a lack of transparency in their management and from the fact that one third of the NGOs active in Moldova refuses to give details on annual budgets and turnover. 13 In order to address this lack of trust and transparency several Moldovan NGOs mobilized They were threatened to be investigated for allegedly used foreign donor funding to engage in political activities, a situation which is prohibited by law in Moldova.
The fact that the Moldovan government continues to exert pressure on the media (by withholding broadcasting licenses for instance) also means that due to self-censorship in the media, critical NGOs have less access to the media and press in order to convey their ideas and publicize their activities.
These points should be borne in mind throughout the report, particularly in the section on effectiveness and impact. In other words, certain NGOs may actually be very effective in terms of reaching their stated aims, but their overall impact on policy-makers or society at large may remain limited or suffer from the structural drawbacks described above (lack of legitimacy and capacity).
Transnistria
Whilst Moldova's legal framework in principle also applies to Transnistria, as a legitimate part of Moldova's integration with the EU serves to make Moldova more attractive in the longer term for Transnistria and to reduce the relative importance of Russian assistance to Transnistria. The EU is considering using the ENP's financial instruments to also engage with the Transnistrian region, starting with its civil society. Secondly, as noted above, the EU uses 'soft power' tools (notably through the ENP and the EUMoldova Action Plan), in particular with regard to encouraging democratisation, trade (the preferential access to the EU market of Moldovan goods) and people to people contacts (liberalized visa regime and local cross-border traffic, student exchanges, etc. 21 Similarly, Transnistrian producers may seek to register with the Moldovan authorities in Chisinau in order to be able to export their goods to the EU market under the same favourable conditions as Moldovan producers. In other words, the EU is seeking to put in place a critical mass of incentives on the Moldovan side, which would make it attractive enough (implying that Transnistrian people, businesses and eventually also politicians would find it costly to pursue a separate state solution) in order to change the status quo of the conflict.
The EU's involvement in solving the Transnistria conflict

Most of the EU's involvement in solving the
An essential point remains the fact that it is unclear whether the EU's 'soft power tools' -without offering Moldova the promise of EU accession -are effective enough to substantially change the status quo of the conflict.
Finally, the EU has also declared its readiness to financially support a package of confidence building measures proposed by Moldova in 2006, consisting of a set of common projects between the right and left bank, which are being discussed in working groups between both sides. At present these address concrete socio-economic questions which serve to improve the lives of people in the Transnistrian region. The first tranche will consist of civil society projects to be implemented in Transnistria, in the field of health, environment and education. It remains to be seen if these projects will not simply serve to reinforce the present status quo in the short term, by improving the situation on the ground.
However, the previous EU strategy of complete non-engagement and isolation of the Transnistrian regime has not resulted in its collapse and has not made it more prone to negotiate a solution to the conflict, either.
The EU's engagement with civil society in Moldova/Transnistria
The EU and civil society in Moldova
The EU disposes of other means to contribute towards finding a solution to the Transnistria conflict. It has the possibility to directly engage with Moldovan civil society, including on solving the Transnistrian conflict, but also in order to assist the democratisation and reform process as described above. Compared with the means deployed through official diplomacy or its 'soft power', the EU's involvement with Moldovan/Transnistrian civil society may seem rather limited. Nevertheless, through the implementation of the EU-Moldova Action Plan, the EU is contributing to the democratization of Moldova, to setting up stable democratic institutions (including an independent judiciary) respectful of the rule of law. Alongside the Council of Europe and its Venice Commission, and the OSCE, the EU is also instrumental in ensuring the democratization of Moldova. Despite being guided in its reform efforts by these institutions, Moldova still faces many shortcomings in terms of ensuring free and fair elections, ensuring the rule of law, ensuring an uncontrolled and uncensored press and media, ensuring an effective fight against corruption, etc.
Fortunately, as described above, Moldova's normative framework with regard to the activities of civil society is quite permissive. As a result this allows the EU to collaborate with Moldovan CSOs in order to further the aims stated in the ENP. The EU-Moldova Action Plan also makes several references to the EU's cooperation with Moldovan civil society. In particular, the section on "Political dialogue and In addition to the EU's financial instruments, funds for civil society are also made available by the aid agencies of individual EU Member States, such as the UK's DFID or Sweden's SIDA. Many of these agencies have been very actively involved for a number of years now with local civil society and have successfully implemented projects on both banks of the Nistru. The report will, therefore, also take into consideration projects which have been funded by EU Member States, but will not consider them separately from EU funded projects.
The EU, civil society in Transnistria and the UNDP
In principle the EU's policies, financial instrument and the provisions of the EU-Moldova Action Plan (including those on civil society) also apply to the Since the EU cannot rely on local CSOs or on the Transnistrian authorities to implement EU projects, it has to rely on other international partners (such as for instance the UNDP) and non-Transnistrian
NGOs to reach civil society in the region. For instance, the EU works through Moldovan or Ukrainian NGOs (or other foreign NGOs) which establish cooperation or sub-contract a part of the EU-funded project to Transnistrian NGOs.
The UNDP for instance plays a very important role in supporting EU efforts with regard to civil society in Transnistria, and in Moldova as a whole. Usually, the UNDP will identify the issues at stake (i.e. poverty, humanitarian aid, etc.) and will consult on various issues with the EU and possibly secure EU funding for a number of projects. It will then monitor the proper implementation of the projects. The EU relies on the UNDP in particular for projects in Transnistria. The UNDP is seen as more impartial in Transnistria and it already disposes of a large local network and staff on which the EU Delegation in Moldova can rely. This prevents duplication of resources and provides for a distribution of labour: the EU has the funds and a political agenda for the region, whereas the UNDP disposes of the know-how, the organization and works closely with other international organizations such as the World Bank.
Although EU funds cannot be disbursed through official channels to Transnistria, the EU has currently earmarked € 1.8 million for projects in the fields of education, health and environment in Transnistria.
The EU closely cooperates with the Moldovan Ministry for Reintegration which has held consultations with the Transnistrian authorities in order to draw up a list of priority projects that can then be submitted to the EU for approval and funding. 28 The EU is hopeful that these consultations as well as the future cooperation on a number of projects between the authorities of both banks of the Nistru, may increase mutual trust and confidence. More funds are foreseen in the economic field if the first series of projects are successful and if the Transnistrian authorities continue to show openness for such EU projects. During the current economic crisis, which hits Transnistria even harder than Moldova proper, funds from the EU are being welcomed, as long as there are no conditions attached with regard to democratisation and human rights. Particularly in Transnistria, many NGOs, with a socio-economic agenda tend to address issues such as poverty, human rights, educational and social policies, which result from the situation created by the conflict due to the existence of an unrecognized regime in the Transnistrian region. For Transnistrian
Effectiveness and impact of Moldovan/Transnistrian CSOs
NGOs it is particularly difficult to implement projects which directly address conflict-related issues or In all cases, activities are geared towards the peaceful transformation of the conflict. Whilst the accent was in previous years put on researching and publicizing the causes of the conflict in the hope of influencing public opinion and the authorities in the resolution negotiations, now most CSOs gear their efforts (and receive funding for) addressing these causes or the wider issues which were engendered by the conflict. People on both banks are living already 17 years in de facto separate political entities, governed by different laws and mentalities. Whilst the older generation still shares a common soviet mental background, the fact that a new generation of Transnistrians has grown up with the knowledge that Transnistria is a distinct political entity with a distinct cultural identity closely linked to Russia is seen as an impediment to solving the conflict. As such Moldovan CSOs seek to address the lack of knowledge of and prejudices on the Transnistrian region and its inhabitants (and vice versa, on Moldova), to work towards democratizing and enforcing civil society in the Transnistrian region through capacity building, training, exchanges, etc. The idea is to build the necessary personal networks and capacity in Transnistria so that these local CSOs can one day function independently and sustainably, so that they can become drivers of democratisation in the region. However, this evolution is not only a strategy of the local CSOs, but also represents a change in tactic by the donor community which has understood the interest of building bridges across the two communities. This is particularly easy in Moldova/Transnistria considering that the conflict is not ethnic in nature (but rather geopolitical) and that there is no language barrier.
Two grassroots NGOs have an indirect bearing on the conflict. The environmental Moldovan CSO considers addressing concrete socio-economic issues and ecological issues on both banks of the Nistru river as more effective in bringing the communities together than other types of above-mentioned activities. By using the same methods (capacity-building, resources and information centres, visits and exchanges, trainings) this CSO tries to stress the importance of overcoming the lack of trust and psychological obstacles to cooperation resulting from living 17 years in separate entities where the other is seen as unwilling, incapable, ill-intentioned, etc (as opposed to working on specific issues that can contribute to resolving the conflict). The grassroots human rights NGO has a similar approach but focuses on helping people, especially in Transnistria, with legal assistance and advice on human rights, as well as reinforces the capacity of Transnistrian NGOs to function despite pressure and abuse from the Transnistrian authorities.
Due to their perceived role in Moldovan society (lack of social authority and legitimacy, lack of access to the media, largely ignored by the government authorities and sometimes even the international community) the activities of all the Moldovan CSO are mostly non-adversarial, in that they are rarely able to confront the policy of the Moldovan government on the conflict. One mid-level CSO mentioned the project "Transnistrian Dialogues" whereby participants from both banks joined a series of three seminars to debate about the Transnistrian conflict, the aim being to develop understanding of each other's position and that of the international community, to create a dialogue, to find common ground, to establish links and networks. The participants were CSO representatives, experts, media representatives but also local officials and politicians or working for the respective administrations, but also EU officials, and included as much adversarial and fuelling as non-adversarial and peacekeeping or holding NGOs.
Another Moldovan CSO 30 is in charge of a weekly radio programme on Transnistria, made specifically for the Transnistrian public in order to provide access to an alternative source of information and to allow them to engage in a debate about their daily problems. Yet another mid-level CSO 31 is organizing a bi-monthly round-table with conflict resolution experts during which the latest developments with regard to the Transnistrian conflict are discussed. A report is produced at the end of each round-table with concrete recommendations for solving the conflict and forwarded to the parties to the conflict and those involved in solving it, as well as the relevant embassies in Moldova and the international community. and without a political consensus.
Traditionally, most activities centered on addressing the causes of the conflict and the larger mid-level CSOs still work in this direction. However, increasingly attention is paid to solving the symptoms of the conflict. Addressing socio-economic issues which are directly or indirectly linked to the existence of the conflict, such as poverty, corruption, the low level of education and social services, low wages and pensions, restricted travel, forced migration, etc. are considered in Moldova but especially in Transnistria as more important than finding a political solution to the conflict. This has been observed by local CSOs, particularly the grassroots ones, and more recently by the donor community, which increasingly provide funding in this direction. Socio-economic projects can also be implemented more easily in Transnistria than those with a political orientation, since the Transnistrian authorities view them with less suspicion and even welcome the additional funds.
In view of the above most of the CSO activities had a peace-building impact due to the fact that they sought to provide a link between the Moldovan/Transnistrian society at large and their government as well as the international community, in the field of conflict resolution. In addition, their activities focused overwhelmingly on creating the necessary conditions for solving the conflict as much at the political level as at the social level, i.e. creating the necessary preconditions through establishing contacts, dialogue, changing perceptions and mentalities. One CSO had a holding impact due to its focus on very specific issues which in the short-term neither positively nor negatively affect the 32 Interview in Chisinau, 10 June 2009. 33 Schools outside its jurisdiction also include those schools which teach in Romanian/Moldovan, but with a Cyrillic script, as was the case under the Soviet Union, and following a soviet-era curriculum.
conflict. Instead it seeks to make the status quo more viable for the people (i.e. by addressing their socio-economic concerns without addressing also the underlying issues of the conflict).
Transnistria
1. Youth information centre (Tiraspol). Mid-level youth CSO.
2. Journalist (Tiraspol). Mid-level local media CSO.
3. Think Tank (Tiraspol). Mid-level pro-government CSO.
4. Academic Institution (Tiraspol). Mid-level educational CSO.
Youth association (Tiraspol). Grassroots youth CSO.
6. Educational association (Dubasari -Transnistria). Grassroots educational CSO. One youth NGO which is well-established and has cooperated on EU-funded projects, claimed that it tried to become an umbrella organization, but did not succeed, and instead started focusing on more concrete projects in the social field. It was until recently part of a major peace-building project together with foreign and right bank (Moldovan) NGOs. To their regret, this peace-building project which lasted three years produced no visible results and its overall impact remained unclear. However, most NGOs which are part of the system and which seek ways to justify the status quo or to work towards a separate Transnistrian state can be considered as having a holding approach. They do not have a fuelling approach because they do not seek to exacerbate any ethnic or political tensions.
On the contrary, these CSOs are ready to engage in dialogue with their counterparts on the right bank and to collaborate on projects and issues which have an impact on the resolution of the conflict.
The EU's engagement will civil society: testing three hypotheses
The interviews with CSOs in Moldova/Transnistria provide most of the data to test the three hypotheses (the liberal peace paradigm, the leftist and the realist critique). Documents and secondary literature also provide useful additional data which inform the discussion about the validity of the three hypotheses on the EU's engagement with Moldovan/Transnistrian civil society with regard to conflict transformation.
Hypothesis 1: The liberal peace paradigm
The EU has contributed and is contributing to conflict transformation by strengthening the structure of local civil society to the extent that it reinforces the interconnectedness between mid-level CSOs and From the textual analysis of secondary literature and data collected from the interviews it emerges that the EU attains the minimum threshold objective of doing no harm. The EU has so far been careful not to reinforce the status quo through the use of its 'soft power' tools and through its interactions with Moldovan/Transnistrian CSOs. However, the EU is planning a number of civil society projects in Transnistria in non-political fields (education, health, environment and later also economic and traderelated) which seek to address the socio-economic hardships of the population of the left bank. Making the situation more viable for Transnistrians in this de facto independent region, without also simultaneously applying pressure on the Transnistrian authorities to find a negotiated solution to the conflict within the 5+2 international negotiating format, may eventually backfire as this would only serve to strengthen the status quo. In this sense, CSOs with a peace-building agenda which cooperate on such projects may turn out to have a holding impact with regard to the conflict. At this stage, therefore, it comes as no surprise that the Transnistrian authorities welcome the EU funds which may help to keep some of the social pressure off the regime in these dire economic times.
It is the EU's aim to strengthen the capacity, visibility and impact of CSOs with a peace-building agenda and the EU does so in principle by increasing these agents' legitimacy vis-à-vis the other actors involved in conflict transformation. Considering that the EU's deeper engagement with civil society is fairly recent (only in the last three to four years) and that it is generally considered as a benign or positive actor by civil society on both banks of the Nistru, means that the side-effects of being co-opted by the EU are also benign. At the same time it remains unclear whether the EU actually reaches the maximum threshold objective: through EU-funded projects fuelling CSO are engaging into a dialogue with peace-building ones, but so far data from the interviews suggests that this has not yet resulted in a change of approach towards the conflict by the fuelling CSOs and that this is not the best way to do it. 38 The interviewees consider this to be the limit of what peace-building CSOs can achieve with EU funds, claiming that a change in attitude may only be possible if such a change also occurs at the political level in Russia and Transnistria, considering that most of the fuelling CSO are controlled by either Moscow or Tiraspol. 39 Nevertheless, the hypothesis put forward by the liberal paradigm is by and large supported by the evidence from the interviews and from secondary literature.
Hypothesis 2: The Leftist Critique
The EU's involvement may in principle inadvertently be (but should not be) detrimental to conflict transformation as hypothesized by the leftist critique. The EU's involvement in general with regard to the Transnistrian conflict (i.e. not only the EU's engagement with Moldovan/Transnistrian CSOs, but the deployment of its 'soft power' tools and on-the-ground presence, notably through the EUBAM)
stems from a wish to bring stability and security to its eastern flank as enshrined it the ENP's conceptual documents and in the European Security Strategy (adopted in 2003). In this sense, the EU seeks to change the present status quo and hopes that it may unblock the deadlock in conflict settlement negotiations. Further, as mentioned before, the EU departs from the premise that any solution to the conflict should respect Moldova's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Hence, it results that the EU will likely support (or initiate) projects in Moldova which uphold these two principles: 1) more security and stability in the eastern neighbourhood (i.e. change the status quo), and 2) respect for Moldova's territorial integrity (i.e. reject a two-state solution). To this end the EU will engage with CSOs whose activities are mindful of these two principles, thereby in theory excluding interaction with CSOs engaged in fuelling or holding activities.
CSOs with fuelling activities work towards an outcome to the conflict which will make the EU's eastern flank less secure and more unstable and which violate Moldova's territorial integrity. CSOs Grassroots CSOs do on occasion complain that EU funds are monopolised by the well-established mid-level peace-building CSOs, but one also has to consider the type of projects that are being implemented with regard to the resolving conflict. These consist either in research and advocacy activities, or involve training of and round-tables with officials, journalists, other CSOs etc. These activities are best handled by these mid-level CSOs rather than by theme-based grassroots CSOs. In fact, additional EU funds are being made available in order to address specific socio-economic issues which grassroots CSOs work on and which can also have a beneficial impact on resolving the conflict, such as better access to information, impartial media sources, a better education, etc.
Whilst there is a wide social and political consensus with regard to Moldova's European integration efforts, the official EU take on the resolution of the conflict is not always met with unanimity in Moldova and certainly very rarely in Transnistria. The Moldovan government may find the EU's positions supportive in its own efforts to resolve the conflict, but many social organizations adopt a more critical approach, considering the EU's efforts too weak. In Transnistria, the EU's actions with regard to the conflict are often considered by the authorities as hostile and as a means to destabilise the regime. Amongst the Transnistrian CSOs usually a more neutral approach prevails.
Many Moldovan/Transnistrian CSOs depend to a large extent on the injection of EU money or on
Western donors proposing projects with a peace-building impact and hence these CSOs may have a financial interest to implement such projects. This is particular the case in Transnistria where the dependence on external funding is even more acute. However, it is not clear that this may limit their credibility and hence affect the project's impact. Surely, their message may not resonate well with the Transnistrian authorities, but may do so with the wider population which on the whole has a neutral to positive view of the EU.
40
Mid-level independent CSOs in Moldova/Transnistria consider that they can be truly independent only if they espouse European values and if they adopt a pro-European agenda. Therefore, whilst EU funds are vital, they have a genuine desire to be co-opted in the EU's in conflict resolution efforts, in particular because they can contribute with their knowledge of the situation on the ground and with their social networks and contacts. If anything, the more the EU co-opts such CSOs the more legitimate the EU's actions with regard to conflict resolution are likely to become in both Moldova and Transnistria. Therefore, the scenario hypothesised by the leftist critique seems inappropriate in Moldova's case. 40 This stems from a lack of knowledge of the EU, which is seen as a rather toothless and amorphous entity, without a clear political authority, but with lots of money to spare. Essentially, such views rest on the image which is spread by the Russian media. At this stage, such a limited image of the EU works in the EU's favour with regard to engaging with Transnistrian CSOs and with regard to the impact of EU-funded projects within Transnsitrian society.
Hypothesis 3: The Realist Critique
At first sight the realist critique represents a relevant hypothesis in the case of Moldova. Moldova is a country whose polity and society are still in transition, from a totalitarian to a democratic system of governance. As described above, Moldova continues to make progress with regard to its process of democratization and the EU contributes to this process through the tools provided for by its ENP. The Action Plan in particular is an important tool which 'pressurises' the Moldovan government to maintain the pace of reforms, with regard to setting up democratic institutions, ensuring the rule of law, the freedom of expression etc. As such, the Moldovan state allows for the existence of an active (though not vibrant) civil society. The EU can therefore engage with civil society and does not only have to rely on its relations with the official authorities. The EU can effectively deploy a dual strategy in terms of conflict transformation, by on the one hand engaging with the Moldovan authorities, and on the other hand by engaging with Moldovan civil society. To the extent that the first strategy can be effective, which is the case to some degree when the Moldovan authorities cooperate with the EU on solving the conflict, this will provide the second strategy (i.e. engaging with civil society) with a better opportunity to become effective as well.
In Transnistria, however, the picture is very different. Whilst the EU officials (such as the EU Special
Representative for Moldova) have established unofficial contacts and links with the authorities and a number of moderate politicians in Transnistria, the EU's policy is one of non-engagement with the separatist regime, lest it be considered by the actors involved in solving the conflict as a sign of official EU recognition. 41 The Transnistrian authorities view the EU's conflict resolution efforts as detrimental to their interests and are therefore reluctant to either cooperate with the EU on solving the conflict or to allow for a greater involvement of independent civil society in political matters. As a result, the EU has been considering engaging directly with the Transnistrian civil society for some time. The series of projects which the EU has foreseen for Transnistria, which will be implemented by local CSOs is a step in this direction. However, once more it should be stressed that these projects will be carried out in the socio-economic field and not in politically sensitive areas. In addition, there are some drawbacks to this strategy as mentioned above (i.e. lack of an organised independent civil society, lack of credible interlocutors, lack of CSO's with a capacity to implement projects, pressure 
Conclusion
In the last section of the paper, the EU's engagement with civil society in Moldova and Transnistria has been tested against three hypotheses: the liberal peace paradigm, the leftist critique and the realist critique. Overall, the data gathered from interviews and secondary literature tends to validate the liberal hypothesis, to partially validate the realist critique, whilst the leftist critique remains largely inappropriate for understanding the EU's involvement in conflict transformation through Moldovan and Transnistrian civil society. This can best be explained through the existence of a number of elements which allow the EU to co-opt particularly the mid-level CSOs on conflict transformation efforts, without so far reinforcing the status quo.
First, the EU's clear agenda with regard to Moldova's conflict allows it to identify and co-opt those CSOs whose peace-building activities conform to the EU's views on the conflict. Compared to other conflicts around the EU's neighbourhood, the EU is much more involved politically in mediation and conflict resolution efforts as a single entity and the EU has a clear view of the type of resolution which is desired. This is less the case in Georgia (where the 2008 August war with Russia left EU countries divided on the issue) or in Nagorno-Karabakh where the EU's involvement is left to a handful of EU member states. A similar situation exists in Western Sahara whereas in the Israel-Palestine case the EU does not dispose of the same political leverage as it has with regard to Moldova/Transnistria. In particular, the EU's policies towards Moldova and its 'soft power' tools are designed in such a way that they seek to 'unlock' the status quo of the conflict.
Second, Moldova's reasonably good track-record of implementing its EU Action Plan opens up the public space for CSOs to operate and to cooperate on EU projects. At the same time, the EU favours cooperation with well-established CSOs that have the capacity to run EU-funded projects, to the detriment of grass-roots organization. Currently, this is not necessarily such a bad thing considering that grass-roots organizations tend to engage more often than not in holding activities. However, holding CSOs in Transnistria may play a key role if they are used strategically by the EU, as many of them have the potential to become peace-building CSOs if they are increasingly exposed to cooperation with the EU and CSOs from the other side of the Nistru. If marginalized, they may have a fuelling impact. Hence, the leftist critique should perhaps inform the EU's actions more in this regard, due to the fact that a CSO's agenda and impact (even of a holding nature) may evolve over time, i.e. it needn't be fixed. Such a change is less likely to happen in CSOs with a fuelling agenda, which are currently not considered as project partners by the EU.
A third element consists of the fairly positive image that the EU enjoys among the population in Moldova and to a lesser extent in Transnistria. This means that EU projects can more readily be implemented (including in Transnistria) and that trust is built more rapidly between the EU and CSOs or the EU and the respective authorities. Naturally, the level of cooperation and trust is far greater on the right bank than it is on the left bank, but the current economic downturn facilitates the EU's access to Transnistria, where authorities are welcoming extra funds in order to alleviate social pressures.
This third element greatly facilitates the EU's engagement with civil society -as an alternative to the authorities -in solving the conflict. In addition, co-opting civil society does not have harmful sideeffects in terms of loss of credibility or legitimacy in view of the neutral to positive image of the EU with Moldovan and Transnistrian society. Hence, the realist and leftist critiques do not apply in this regard.
Fourthly, the realist critique gains in relevance, however, owing to the fact that many local CSOs on both banks consider that EU-funded projects alone can not transform the conflict and that first and foremost political authorities need to operate the change in the status quo. Hence, the EU's involvement with local CSOs may have a limited impact if the EU does not relentlessly also pursue the diplomatic path for resolving the conflict. Similarly, the fact that Transnistrian CSOs consider a partnership with local (village or city) authorities as an almost necessary precondition for the success of a project also points to the fact that the realist critique remains relevant in the case of Transnistria because ultimately it means that the EU cannot effectively engage with local Transnistrian CSOs independently.
These four elements, which are structural by nature, point to the fact that the EU's engagement with CSOs is less important in terms of impact on the conflict than the actual change in political environment which is generated by the ENP and which has a potential to alter the status quo. Many
NGOs on both banks also pointed out that EU-funded projects, though to be welcomed, will ultimately have little immediate effect on transforming the conflict. Instead, these projects may facilitate a social transition that may then indirectly lead to conflict transformation. However, this remains a long-term vision and subject to many obstacles, making it all the more difficult at present to rightfully appreciate the nature of the impact of EU-CSO cooperation on conflict transformation in Moldova. For the EU:
Recommendations for
-listen more closely to Moldovan and Transnistrian CSOs in terms of the practical problems they encounter when applying for funds or implementing projects;
-finance smaller but more projects which can be more easily managed by smaller and less established NGOs;
-collaborate with newer NGOs which often are more in touch with the grassroots and society at large, than the more elitist mid-level NGOs with work more closely with the government and international community;
-EU member state and US foundations and aid agencies already finance many good projects. The EU needs to better coordinate its own assistance with the other donors.
-working through the UNDP may have some advantages for the EU, but in general is considered as a waste of a chunk of the funding. Instead a team of project coordinators may be active at the EC Delegation to oversee the implementation of a part of the EU-funded project.
-in general the EC Delegation in Moldova is considered as not active and not visible enough.
-the EU may consider opening an information centre in Transnistria in which CSOs can find information on funding opportunities (provided an agreement is reached with the Transnistrian authorities);
-the necessity for EU-funded media projects have been underlined. In media-related projects when funding is withdrawn or runs out these projects usually collapse. It is therefore imperative that such projects become sustainable in the long term.
